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Abstract  
This paper proposes a theory on information security. We argue that information security is 
imperfectly understood and aim to bring about an altered understanding of why efforts are made to 
engage in information security. The goal of information security is widely recognised as the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information however we argue that the goal is actually to 
simply create resources. This paper responds to calls for more theory in information systems, places 
the discussion in philosophical context and compares various definitions. It then identifies the key 
concepts of information security, describes the relationships between these concepts, as well as scope 
and causal explanations. The paper provides the theoretical base for understanding why information is 
protected, in addition to theoretical and practical implications and suggestions for future research. 
Keywords  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Despite the concept of information security being very well established, the reasons and motivations 
behind it are imperfectly understood. This paper seeks to explain how and why the phenomena that 
comprise the concepts of information security occur. The emphasis for this paper is to explain the 
information security concepts and relationships between them in order to alter our understanding of 
why we protect information.  
This proposed theory on information security simply states that the motivation behind all attempts by 
an organisation to secure information against threats is to create resources that can later improve 
organisational performance. Information will degrade over time without adequate controls 
implemented for its protection. In terms of the taxonomy of information systems theories presented by 
Gregor (2006), this manuscript provides a (Type 2) high-level theory for explanation, describing how 
and why the phenomenon of information security occurs.  
The theory on information security originates from the area of information systems, built entirely from 
concepts that relate to information and the breadth of systems that it can reside on. It applies to 
different levels, including strategies to protect information used by individuals, groups, organisations 
and also protects information shared between organisations. The results are that, depending on the 
information affected, degradation over time may reduce the usefulness of the resource and thus lead to 
the potential erosion of competitive advantage or organisational success. 
The paper proceeds in three major sections, with the major headings and sections structure adapted 
from Rivard (2014). In the next section, we introduce information security, discuss why a theory on 
information security is needed and carefully examine issues with existing theory. Secondly, we explain 
the theory on information security. Thirdly, we examine the implications for the development of this 
theory. Finally, we briefly draw conclusions, consider limitations and offer proposals for future 
research to improve our theoretical understanding of information security. 
2 WHAT IS INFORMATION SECURITY? 
The following section begins with a narrative describing why a new theory on information security is 
needed.  This description of what motivates the study is based on an exploration of the theoretical 
issues in relevant literature. The result is a set of conditions that this new theoretical development then 
meets.  
2.1 Motivating the Study 
This paper is broadly motivated by calls for ‘good theory’ within the domain of information systems 
(Webster and Watson 2002; Zmud 1998; Zmud et al. 2001). The current paucity of good quality 
theories in the information systems domain leads to calls for development of our ‘own’ theory (Markus 
and Saunders 2007; Weber 2003; Weber 2012). Importantly, there have been calls for bolder and 
more original information systems explanatory theory (Grover et al. 2008). The development of new 
ideas and theories is scarce yet essential (Markus and Saunders 2007; Rivard 2014). Therefore, to 
begin with, as Weber (2003, pp. iii) states, “choosing the phenomena we wish to explain or predict—is 
the most important decision we make as a researcher”.  
More specifically, this paper is motivated by an apparent gap in the literature where a theory on 
information security is not apparent. A search of the academic literature, as described in the next 
section, does not reveal any literature that purports to offer a theory on information security. This 
search of overlooked areas is a form of neglect-spotting (Sandberg and Alvesson 2011).  
Stronger theory can be produced from linking theories of diverse types and academics have been urged 
to consider combining other types of theory with their own (Gregor 2006). Towards that, using this 
theory on information security as one that underpins a theoretical perspective on information security 
strategy in organisations could prove useful (Horne et al. 2015).  
There are theories that relate to information security. For example, the Theory of Information 
Warfare presents a model of information warfare in terms of four main elements: information 
resources, players, offensive operations, and defensive operations (Denning 1999). The Theory of 
Protection Motivation predicts users’ intentions to protect themselves after receiving fear-arousing 
recommendations (Rogers 1975). There are no theories however where the locus of knowledge is in 
information security alone.  
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This gap however is not because information security is uninteresting. Almost every organisation 
requires information to function and disruption to information from a security breach can often lead 
to disruption of an organisation’s operations (Cavusoglu et al. 2004). Therefore filling this gap will 
make a valuable contribution to the body of knowledge.  
2.2 Relevant Literature 
A thematic study of the information systems literature is presented, in order to develop a perspective 
on information security and its interactions. The contextual setting is described before information 
security itself is examined. With this understanding, a theory on information security can then be 
posited based on commonly-accepted philosophy.  
2.2.1 Context 
The theories or knowledge within any discipline are explained based on questions grouped within four 
classes which, in descending order, are 1. domain, 2. ontology, 3. epistemology and 4. socio-political 
(Gregor 2006). This section explores the information security concept within the context of these four 
classes of questions. 
 Domain of Information Systems 
Information systems has been defined as a collective term that refers to a number of areas of 
application, including enterprise integration, natural language translation, geographic information 
systems, legal information systems, and biological information systems (Guarino 1998). Separately, a 
core set of phenomena that defines the information systems field has been defined as including 
information technology (IT) capabilities, the IT artefact, IT practices, usage and impact (Benbasat and 
Zmud 2003). At the broadest level, the domain of information systems has been defined and explained 
as a system composed of people and computers that processes or interprets information, which is the 
view adopted throughout the rest of this paper (D'Atri et al. 2008).  
 Ontological Approach 
Theory is understood within information systems as being broad in nature, to encompass frameworks, 
models, or the body of knowledge (Gregor 2006). The ontological character of theory types has been 
articulated as having five categorisations: analysis, explanation, prediction, explanation and 
prediction, and design and action (Gregor 2006). These categorisations provide researchers with a 
language to describe the various components of theory. 
 Epistemological Approach 
To explore how theory can be constructed and what research methods can be used, we note that 
discussion in this area often contrasts the positivist and interpretivist views, or the quantitative and 
qualitative views (Gregor 2006). As explained later in Section 3.2 - Theory Type, the type of theory 
expounded in this paper is explanatory in nature, and theories of this nature are often associated with 
research in the interpretivist paradigm (Gregor 2006).  
 Socio-political Approach 
Exploring where theory has been developed to date, we find that there have been a surprisingly low 
number of theories, (i.e. fewer than half a dozen) that, when developed, originated solely from the area 
of information systems (Markus and Saunders 2007). Other theories have originating areas that 
include both information systems and a reference discipline, whilst the remainder originate solely 
from another discipline (Gregor 2006).  
Information security is a phenomenon within the information systems domain because it involves 
people protecting information that resides on computers, which are all common elements consistent 
with information systems. From an information systems viewpoint, information security is concerned 
with protecting information (Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen 2007).  
2.2.2 Defining Information Security 
This section documents the definition and goal for each of computer security, information security and 
cyber security. Computer security, also known as information and communication technology (ICT) 
security, is the security of the computers that process and store information (Von Solms and Van 
Niekerk 2013). The goal of computer security is the confidentiality, integrity, availability, non-
repudiation, accountability, authenticity, and reliability of information resources (Von Solms and Van 
Niekerk 2013).  
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Information security used to be purely technical, however has evolved over time to keep pace with 
changes to computers and networks (Von Solms and Van Niekerk 2013). The goal of information 
security involves preserving the confidentiality, integrity and availability of business information 
(McCumber 1991; Posthumus and von Solms 2004). As well, the goal of information security is to 
safeguard business continuity and reduce business impairment by constraining the effect of security 
incidents (Von Solms 1998). In another contribution the goal of information security was stated to be 
confidentiality, integrity, availability and non-repudiation of information (Siponen and Oinas-
Kukkonen 2007).  
Cyber security is different to information security (Von Solms and Van Niekerk 2013). Although they 
are very different, the term cyber security seems to be used interchangeably with the term information 
security in academic literature (Von Solms and Van Niekerk 2013). Cyber security transcends the 
boundaries of information security to include the defence of information and also people (Von Solms 
and Van Niekerk 2013). The goal and general security objectives of cyber security are the availability, 
integrity and confidentiality of an organisation’s assets including networks, infrastructure, information 
and personnel (Von Solms and Van Niekerk 2013).  
Examining the above discourse, we can see that there are three different definitions for computer 
security, information security and cyber security but that their goals seem to be roughly similar, in that 
they are internally-focussed and revolve around confidentiality, integrity, and availability. This 
homogeneity of goals is incongruous given the disparity in definitions and the following section will 
provide an improved goal for information security.  
3 A THEORY ON INFORMATION SECURITY 
A theory can be defined as “a statement of relations among concepts within a boundary set of 
assumptions and constraints” (Bacharach 1989, pp. 496). We argue that information security needs 
its own distinct goal, not just to copy the goal of computer security, and then deconstruct the proposed 
theory on information security into its various elements. This section describes the conceptual 
elements of the proposed theory, the relationships between the concepts, and proposed use of the 
theory. 
3.1 Theory Overview 
Information security is a conscious or subconscious process in which people and organisations attempt 
to create sustainably-viable resources, from information. They do so by applying suitable controls to 
protect information from threats, according to the goals for the use of that information. This then 
results in sustainable resources. Information security focusses on what protection is afforded to 
information and what use that protected information can then offer organisations. 
3.2 Theory Type 
A taxonomy of theory types articulates five categorisations: analysis, explanation, prediction, 
explanation and prediction, and design and action (Gregor 2006). This theory embodies the second 
type: a theory which provides “an explanation of how, why, and when things happened” (Gregor 
2006, pp. 619). To clarify, this paper does not describe and categorise themes within information 
security, as this alone is not theory (Bacharach 1989; Rivard 2014). Rather, this paper distils complex 
concepts in information security and then offers a new explanation of what the motivations behind it 
are, using clear language.  
Theories for explanation are described as an ideal type of theoretical contribution (Rivard 2014). Pure 
theory papers with explanations of theoretical mechanisms are welcomed as essays with highly valued 
characteristics (Markus and Saunders 2007). Other researchers have posited theories which are 
explanatory in nature without testable propositions (Orlikowski and Robey 1991). The writing of a 
paper where the end product is purely the advancement of a new theory via a detailed explanation is 
perfectly acceptable (Walsham 1995).  
Construct validity can be said to have been achieved when, amongst other principles, the interlocking 
system of laws which constitute a theory (called a nomological network) are made clear, the theoretical 
constructs are observable, and the constructs in the nomological net have been elaborated on 
(Cronbach and Meehl 1955). It is understood that in the early history of a nomological net, as 
described in this paper, the network will be limited and have few connections.   
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3.3 Assumptions 
Clarifying the assumptions of information security is important otherwise there is a risk of 
inappropriate use of the construct. This would then adversely affect construct validity and potentially 
the cumulative research tradition (Roberts et al. 2012).  
Firstly, information security depends on a completed information classification assessment. This 
identifies what information is owned by the organisation and therefore what information needs to be 
protected. It also identifies what bits of information are more important than others. Without this 
assessment of information that is required to be protected, there is no way of clearly identifying which 
controls are most appropriate to deploy.  
Secondly, an organisation’s information security depends on the security budget. If the security budget 
is not large enough to procure the minimum number of controls necessary to protect the information 
identified in the classification assessment, then the integrity of the information is threatened.  
Finally, information security depends on an organisation’s ability to match controls with threats. 
Inappropriate selection of controls can lead to either wasteful spending on unnecessary controls or 
conversely, inadequate protection of information which threatens its ability to be sustainably used.  
3.4 Structural Components 
There are various taxonomies of theory structure with one example describing the parts as being 
constructs, associations, states, events, and the whole theory as having importance, novelty, 
parsimony, level and falsifiability (Weber 2012). The structure used in this paper however is based on 
the “structural components of theory” (Gregor 2006, pp. 620). It includes means of representation, 
the constructs which together form the nomological net, the relationships between the constructs and 
the scope. Care is also taken to explain why some theory components were not applicable, such as 
causal explanations, testable propositions and prescriptive statements.  
3.4.1 Means of Representation  
This theory on information security must be represented physically (Gregor 2006). Figure 1 below 
shows the four constructs included in this theory on information security and the three relationships 
between the constructs.   
 
 
Figure 1: Schematic of Theory on Information Security 
3.4.2 Constructs  
The nomological network is comprised of four main constructs: information, controls, threats and 
resources. The following section describes each in turn and ascribes meaning to each. Care is also 
taken to identify whether the construct is observable, because a necessary condition for a construct to 
be scientifically admissible is that it be part of a nomological net of observables (Cronbach and Meehl 
1955). The reason for this is so that we can then apply the famous Verification Principle, which argues 
that only statements which are provable by observation can convey factual information.  
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 Information  
Information is seen as amorphous and can be printed on paper, stored on computers, sent by post or 
electronically, shown on videos and articulated in a discussion (Von Solms and Van Niekerk 2013). As 
well as being stored on physical media such as paper and digital media such as computers, information 
can also reside on cognitive media, i.e. people’s minds (Ahmad et al. 2005). Information can also have 
various levels of sensitivity, is difficult to control which sometimes results in leakage, and is intangible 
in nature (Ahmad et al. 2005). Information however is not data, with the distinction being that data 
are raw facts and information is processed data that is meaningful (McKinney Jr and Yoos 2010). It is 
interesting to note that information hosted in the cloud brings its own set of challenges including (1) 
long-term viability, where information restoration becomes doubtful should the cloud vendor become 
bankrupt, and (2) information availability, where cloud vendors may not restore to a different 
environment should the information become unavailable (Catteddu 2010). 
Information has some attributes including sensitivity and level of analysis. Non-sensitive information 
can be unclassified or if sensitive, classified as PROTECTED, CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET or TOP 
SECRET. This classification is then used as a basis for allocating access rights to organisational staff 
(Ahmad et al. 2014). Information is created and used at all levels of analysis within an organisation at 
varying sensitivities and Table 1 below provides examples of each: 
 
Level of Analysis Non-sensitive Information Sensitive Information 
Individual Desk phone number Passwords 
Group Department name Customer sales list 
Organisational Website URL Trade secrets 
Inter-organisational Purchase order number Sales contract pricing 
Table 1. Examples of Organisational Information and Level of Analysis 
 Controls  
Organisational security controls (or countermeasures) are defined as an appropriate mix of physical, 
technical or operational security controls. The goal of controls is to mitigate the risks to information 
(Posthumus and von Solms 2004). Controls are used to protect information by reducing the risk posed 
by exposures or vulnerabilities arising from threats (Von Solms and Van Niekerk 2013). A strong set of 
protective controls can provide an organisation with an effective defence capability and an 
organisation’s capabilities provide the best defence against the existing array of competitive forces 
(Porter 1980).  
Controls stipulated by standards are intended to prevent and detect attacks from threats, primarily 
through the use of technical, formal, and informal controls. Technical controls are the computer-based 
countermeasures. Formal controls are the policies, procedures, and rules that direct staff. Informal 
controls refer to the development of a security culture and the provisioning of education, training and 
awareness programs (Beebe and Rao 2010). 
 Threats  
There are many threats to the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of organisational information 
along with many countermeasures (Workman et al. 2008). Threats to information systems security 
include unauthorised access, changing of information, and the destruction of protective infrastructure 
that helps preserve the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information (Workman et al. 
2008). Various threats persistently target exposures or vulnerabilities and ultimately have a adverse 
impact on information (Beebe and Rao 2010; Von Solms and Van Niekerk 2013).  
 Resources 
Resources have been defined as “inputs into the production process- they are the basic unit of 
analysis. The individual resources of the firm include items of capital equipment, skills of employees, 
patents, brand names, finance” (Grant 1991, pp. 118). Grant (1991) then continues that the 
organisation should then inventory the available resources and assess them for value generation, 
before developing a strategy to maximise the value from each one.  
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A competing view on business strategy defines resources as comprising all assets, capabilities, 
processes, information and knowledge (Barney 1991). Resources have also been defined as strengths 
that the organisation can use to formulate and implement their strategies (Porter 1981).  
Information resources are crucial to supporting organisational performance by providing prospects for 
the establishment of competitive advantage and as such, preservation of information-based, intangible 
resources is a significant imperative for organisations (Porter and Millar 1985; Teece 2000). For the 
financial returns to an organisation to be sustainable, the resources that support them must also be 
sustainable (Grant 1991). The longevity of the of an organisation’s competitive advantage also depends 
on the speed at which its supporting resources degrade (Grant 1991).  
A key point is that information already exists so it is disingenuous to suggest that protecting it creates 
an entirely new entity. What does happen however is that by protecting information with controls, it 
becomes a robust, ruggedised resource, resilient to threats. This resource can then be relied upon and 
trusted by the organisation to not degrade over time and provide the same utility now as in 20 years.  
To illustrate, imagine a pharmaceutical organisation that has, through a set of multi-year expensive 
trials, successfully developed a new chemical formula for a proposed drug it wishes to take to market. 
This chemical formula on its own is extremely vulnerable because if a competitor organisation can 
steal it through industrial espionage and quickly bring it to market, then the investment has been 
wasted. Once it has been protected with a patent however (which is a form of security control) then it 
will serve as a source of competitive advantage for the organisation for the next 20 years. In this 
example, the theory on information security in this paper would argue that the chemical formula is 
information, the patent application process is a control and the completed patent is a resource.  
3.4.3 Statements of Relationship  
This section describes the relationships between constructs which can be variously described as 
associative, compositional, directional or causal (Gregor 2006). The nature of the theory described in 
this paper means that the relationships are described succinctly but clearly and carefully.  
 R1 – Relationship between Information and Resources  
Information has been conceptualised as amorphous and intangible, with varying degrees of sensitivity, 
various storage platforms and varying levels of analysis. Resources have been conceptualised as 
information-based, sustainable, traceable, durable and able to be assessed for potential use in driving 
competitive advantage. When information is converted into a resource, there are many inferences for 
the final form that it takes and the following is a discussion of them.  
The cause of information being converted into resources is the application of protective controls. 
When these controls are applied, the resulting resources cease to be amorphous and intangible 
because they can now be recorded in an asset tracking register. The storage platform may also change 
due to access restrictions placed on the new resource. Two attributes will remain consistent however, 
which are sensitivity and level of analysis. The only potential changes may be that sensitivity is 
upgraded once maximum value is assessed and level of analysis may change once the resource is made 
available for use throughout the organisation. The creation of a robust resource through the 
application of security controls to information is consistent with the definitions of a resource being 
sustainable and durable.  
 R2 – Relationship between Controls and Information  
Controls positively cause information to be protected. Controls have been defined as being formal, 
informal or technical and all three forms can be applied to information that resides on physical, digital 
and cognitive media. For example, with information that resides on physical media such as paper, a 
formal control might be take the form of message handling procedures that dictate how the page is to 
be marked with a classification indicating the sensitivity of the information and also dissemination 
limiting markers. An informal control might include training on how to mark the paper accordingly. A 
technical control might be a filing cabinet that the paper can be stored in.  
 R3 – Relationship between Threats and Information 
Threats negatively cause information to become degraded. Threats intend to degrade the integrity, 
confidentiality and availability of information, with some threats being known and some unknown. 
Threats are persistent (Baskerville 2005). The implication of this is that information will always be 
degraded over time if there are no controls. Even if there are protective security controls, if we accept 
that some threats are unknown (i.e. dynamic, unique, targeted, customised), then the controls won’t 
defend effectively against some threats and information will be degraded.  
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3.4.4 Scope  
Abstracting ideas to a higher level and generalising about a phenomenon, its interactions and the 
degree of causality are at the heart of theory development (Gregor 2006). The scope of a theory is 
described by the generalisability of the construct relationships using modal qualifiers (for example 
some or all) and explanations about boundaries (Gregor 2006).  
In this theory on information security, a statement on the modal qualifiers used to describe the 
relationship between controls and threats is: Some information is protected by some controls to 
produce all resources. An implication of this statement is that if information has not been protected by 
a control, then it cannot be considered a resource. Another is that all information to be used for 
organisational purposes is to be protected. Also, this theory forbids the use of unprotected information 
in organisations. The reason that the qualifier all was not used with information or controls is that 
there is no way of determining whether this theory holds true for all information and controls since the 
authors do not have access to all information and controls to make an assessment.  
The boundaries of this theory on information security include that it specifically applies to the 
protection of information and not to the protection of the infrastructure, networks or platforms that 
information resides on. Protection of infrastructure, networks and platforms is better known as 
computer security, communications security or cyber security (Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen 2007). 
This theory is not bounded by levels of analysis as the use of this theory to explain why organisations 
protect information applies equally at the individual, group, organisational and inter-organisational 
levels, i.e. resources are created and used at all four levels.  
3.4.5 Theory Components Not Present 
There are three structural elements to this theory on information security that are not present, given 
this type of theory is explanatory not predictive. They are a definitive causal explanation, testable 
propositions and prescriptive statements, which are explained more fully in the following sections.  
 Causal Explanations 
This theory on information security states that the application of controls causes the conversion of 
information into resources. However, can this be said to be always true? There are four different types 
of causal analysis (Gregor 2006): 
i. Regularity (or nomological) analysis, i.e. ‘A causes B’; 
ii. Counterfactual analysis, i.e. ‘If not A, then not B’; 
iii. Probabilistic causal analysis, i.e. ‘A increases the likelihood of B’; 
iv. Manipulation or teleological causal analysis, i.e. ‘If A, then B’; 
In this paper, the terms explanation or causal explanation refer to the third type of causal analysis, 
being the probabilistic causal analysis type. In other words, the application of controls increases the 
likelihood of information being converted into resources. The reason is that this probabilistic type of 
causality is more suited to social sciences, and in this case, an infinite number of people are interacting 
with an infinite number of controls protecting an infinite amount of information, which means we lack 
a closed system where all the variables can be identified (Gregor 2006). If we lack the ability to identify 
all the variables, then we cannot claim to be partaking in regularity analysis.  
Probabilistic reasoning alone however, is not enough to provide definitive statements of relationships 
amongst phenomena, which is why this theory component is said to be not present (Gregor 2006).  
 Testable propositions or hypotheses 
The hallmark of scientific theory is that universal statements can be made about constructs and their 
relationships that are falsifiable (i.e. testable) (Gregor 2006). Theories for prediction provide testable 
propositions that can be evaluated empirically (Gregor 2006). Explanatory theories however do not 
provide any testable propositions (Gregor 2006). This explanatory theory on information security 
should therefore not be applied deterministically.  
 Prescriptive Statements 
Prescriptive statements are the steps in a list that, when followed, lead to the creation of an artefact 
(Gregor 2006). This theory on information security does not provide any prescriptive statements 
about the manner in which controls should be applied to information in order to protect it and create 
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resources. Therefore, prescriptive statements are said to not be part of this explanatory theory on 
information security.   
4 IMPLICATIONS OF THEORY ON INFORMATION SECURITY 
This section advances the various implications of the research model and these are separated into both 
research and practice areas (Zmud 1998). Some of these implications inform the suggested future 
research directions in Section 5 Conclusion.  
4.1 Theoretical  
Implications for theoretical research include the possible linking of this theory on information security 
with the theory on internal analysis, which considers the use of resources to be fundamental to the 
creation and protection of competitive advantage. This highlights the potential for supporting the 
further developmental work being conducted on understanding information security strategy. For 
example, resources are combined to produce capabilities, which then form the main basis for an 
organisation’s competitive advantage subject to certain criteria (Grant 1991; Porter 1980).  
Alternatively, as described in Section 2.1 - Motivating the Study, this theory on information security 
could form the basis of a theoretical perspective on information security strategy in organisations. The 
theory could explain the motivation behind efforts to protect strategic information at the 
organisational and inter-organisational levels. Research into information security strategy forms an 
emerging field that requires a theoretical base. 
4.2 Practical  
Implications for practice include ideas for the situational contexts where information security would 
be most applicable (Zmud 1998). Practical ways that this theory on information security can make an 
impact include indicating the need for better identification and management of resource and controls.  
5 CONCLUSION 
The study advances knowledge in the information security field by creating a new understanding of 
what information security is and the motivations behind it. The following section recaps the 
contribution made in this paper, identifies the limitations constraining research into information 
security and offers suggestions for future research directions.  
5.1 Contribution 
This section provides a strong rationalisation for why the conceptualisations developed in this article 
have advanced our collective understanding of the information security phenomenon. 
Based on our review, no theory on information security was apparent in the literature and this paper 
now offers one. This theory on information security states that the goal focussing all attempts by an 
organisation to secure information against threats is to create resources that can then later be used for 
organisational performance. The confidentiality, integrity and availability of information is the goal of 
controls not information security.  
5.2 Limitations of Research into Information Security 
The theory on information security is of help to academics looking to explain the theoretical base for 
conceptual models and frameworks that involve information security. We have described firstly, what 
type of theory it is and secondly, its structural components including individual construct elements 
and the relationships between them. However, we still have limitations on our perception of 
information security theory and this section describes them. 
Firstly, information security has been conceptualised in various forms, including as a process (Von 
Solms and Van Niekerk 2013). It has also been variously been described as a capability and a 
framework (Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen 2007). This raises concerns around construct validity issues 
as adhering to one conceptualisation risks marginalising another.   
Secondly, this information security theory can be applied at various levels, as stated previously in 
Section 3.4.4 - Scope. However, this does not take into account communication required between the 
number of people who may have to cooperate at group level as opposed to individual level, for 
instance. At inter-organisational level, there are differences between the way that organisations 
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collaborate as opposed to the way that a staff group would collaborate. As a result, the nomological net 
for each of the levels will be different.  
Thirdly, there does not seem to be a way to measure when information has been protected enough by 
controls and can therefore be deemed a resource. If this knowledge could be developed, ‘minimum-
viable resource’ criteria could be developed.  
5.3 Future Research Directions 
Information security theory has fecundity and raises new opportunities for information systems 
scholars to develop the body of knowledge that currently exists on information security. The authors 
hope this paper raises more questions than can be answered and provides the impetus for further 
research to be conducted. The answers to some of these questions will also have contributions towards 
practice. The following are three suggested research directions for information security theory 
development, with these directions being adapted from Zmud (1998).  
Firstly, the theory presented in this paper can be refuted by developing alternative new theories on 
information security. Hopefully different plausible theories supported by disparate groups of 
researchers will arise and stimulate intellectual debate on the nature of information security.  
Secondly, existing theories from reference disciplines can be applied to information security. From 
sociology, how could Conflict Theory, which focuses on competition (threats?) to resources 
(information?) and the inherent iniquity afforded some units (organisations?) in society, be adapted to 
information security? From economics, how could the Pareto Principle Theory (the 80/20 rule) be 
adapted to the application of expensive controls in information security? 
Thirdly, improvements to the theory described in this manuscript and its use can be further developed. 
For example, additional theorising of this theory could result in a deeper understanding of the 
relationship between threats and controls. Do they have a bi-directional relationship? Could the use of 
particular controls dictate the threats that present themselves, both internal and external? Could the 
relationship between the constructs within this theory be reduced to a scientific law through the 
development of a mathematical statement such as I x (C/T) = R? How could this paper provide the 
theoretical base for conceptual models or frameworks of information security-related topics? 
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